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Apparatuses of Animality: Foucault Goes to a Slaughterhouse1  
Stephen Thierman, University of Toronto 
 
ABSTRACT: The work of Michel Foucault is not often considered in animal ethics dis-
cussions, but I believe that many of his insights can be fruitfully extended into this area of 
philosophical inquiry.  In this paper, I present the slaughterhouse as a technology of power 
that is complicit in the domination and objectification of both human and nonhuman animal 
subjects.  I begin by arguing that Foucault’s notion of an ‚apparatus‛ is a useful methodolo-
gical tool for thinking about the constellation of spaces and discourses in which various bodies 
(both human and nonhuman) find themselves enmeshed.  Next, I outline Foucault’s multi-
faceted conceptualization of ‚power,‛ and I consider whether it makes sense to think of other 
animals as implicated in ‚power relations‛ in the various Foucauldian senses.  Finally, I 
analyze a journalistic account of a contemporary slaughterhouse.   Here, I argue that a variety 
of hierarchies (spatial, racial, species, etc.) dovetail to create an environment in which care and 
concern are virtually impossible.  By coupling a Foucauldian analysis with certain insights 
developed in the bioethical work of Ralph Acampora, I offer a normative critique of an institu-
tion that has pernicious effects on both human and nonhuman animals. 
 
Keywords: apparatus, Michel Foucault, human–animal relations, Ralph Acampora, slaughter-
house. 
 
The convict said he felt cheated. He wasn’t supposed to be doing Mexican work. After his 
second day he was already talking of quitting.  ‚Man, this can’t be for real,‛ he said, rub-
bing his wrists as if they’d been in handcuffs.  ‚This job’s for an ass.  They treat you like an 
animal.‛ 
 
- Charlie LeDuff, ‚At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things Never Die‛ 
 
If Foucault had written a book about other animals, I imagine that it would have had a 
gripping introduction.  Rather than beginning with Damiens the regicide, he might have 
chosen to recount the last living moments of a pig on his (or her) way to becoming pork chops 
and bacon.  An image of power at its most bludgeoning, it would be a scene filled with dis-
                                                 
1 My title is inspired by Cressida J. Heyes’ essay, ‚Foucault Goes to Weight Watchers,‛ Hypatia 21 (2006): 
126-149. 
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memberment, blood and viscera.  And rather than juxtaposing this scene with Léon Faucher’s 
meticulous prison schedule, Foucault might have instead chosen to follow a day in the life of a 
contemporary, urban cat owner.  Involving trips to the veterinarian’s office, portioned meals 
for weight control and tooth brushing to ensure optimal oral hygiene, it would present a 
contrasting image of a power that regulates and normalizes.  The ensuing text would have, 
presumably, tried to spell out how we get from one of these scenes to the other and how 
power can metamorph from one manifestation to the next. 
 Of course, Foucault did not write such a book.  Thus, it is left to those of us who think 
his methods and conceptual tools can be fruitfully employed to explore our relationships with 
other animals to fill in the blanks.2  This paper aims to work in that direction. 
 
I. “Apparatus” 
In an interview published in 1977, an interlocutor draws attention to Foucault’s reference – in 
the first volume of The History of Sexuality – to an ‚apparatus of sexuality‛ and then queries 
him on the meaning/methodological function of the term ‚apparatus.‛  Foucault responds by 
defining the term in the following way:  
 
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philoso-
phical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus.  The apparatus itself is the system of relations that 
can be established between these elements.3 
 
For Foucault, then, we might say that the description of an apparatus brings a particular 
‚environment‛ into focus.  It outlines a field of interactions that enables a particular kind of 
experience (or perception).  Like a microscope or a hall of mirrors, it causes us to ‚see‛ in a 
particular fashion.4 
 But it is also important to recognize, at the outset, that Foucault’s project is not simply 
descriptive in nature, that is, the exploration of an apparatus is also presented as a means to 
look at a particular topic in a critical way.  For example, Foucault invokes the idea of an 
apparatus of sexuality to argue that a particular way of thinking about sexuality (i.e. the 
                                                 
2 In my ensuing discussion, I will reference many of the theorists who are using Foucault to explore ques-
tions related to animals and animality.  On a slightly different note, for a selection of essays that aims to 
bring Foucault into contact with environmental philosophy more broadly conceived, see, Éric Darier (ed.), 
Discourses of the Environment, (Oxford & Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).  Darier’s introduction, ‚Fou-
cault and the Environment,‛ 1-33, provides an especially useful overview of how the different periods in 
Foucault’s thought might be relevant to debates on the environment. 
3 Michel Foucault, ‚The Confession of the Flesh,‛ in Power/Knowledge: Select Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books Edition, 1980), 193. 
4 Foucault’s general characterization seems consonant with Jean-Louis Baudry’s contemporaneous dis-
cussion of apparatuses in the context of film theory.  Baudry, for his part, encourages us to turn our attention 
away from the content of films and to attend, instead, to the ‚cinematic apparatus‛ (i.e. the dark room, the 
projector, the screen, the seats, etc.) that structures our experience of them.  See Jean-Louis Baudry, ‚The 
Apparatus,‛ Camera Obscura 1 (1976): 104-126. 
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repressive hypothesis) is mistaken.5  When a variety of different elements are juxtaposed – 
such as the heightened concern with the sexuality of children in medical discourse, in the 
context of family relations, and in educational institutions – a novel account of the historical 
emergence of ‚sexuality‛ comes into view.  The apparatus illuminated by Foucault shows us 
how an understanding (and experience) of sexuality in a particular historical location is crea-
ted by the interrelation (and mutual support) of various heterogeneous factors.  Furthermore, 
since an apparatus is ‚always inscribed in a play of power,‛6 thinking in terms of apparatuses 
allows Foucault to highlight the political and power-laden dimensions of those interrelations – 
dimensions that might otherwise be obscured when we think about a topic as ‚natural‛ as our 
sexual being.7 
 I want to appropriate this idea of an ‚apparatus.‛  Along with other Foucauldian con-
cepts and insights, it can be redeployed to investigate another important facet of human life, 
namely, our interactions with other (nonhuman) animals.  Foucault’s own concerns were 
decidedly anthropocentric, but his tools can be used to help us to see our relationships with 
other animals in new ways.8  Towards this end, it is useful to build from Giorgio Agamben’s 
discussion of Foucault’s terminology.9  While Agamben’s first gloss on the term ‚apparatus‛ 
appears to retain a human-centered focus,10 he subsequently goes on to characterize it in a 
more general fashion that, from my perspective, is much more promising.  He defines an 
apparatus as ‚anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, inter-
cept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living 
beings.‛11  On the one hand, we have apparatuses (Agamben uses cellular telephone techno-
                                                 
5 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction (New York: Random House, Vintage 
Books Edition, 1980). See especially, ‚Part Two: The Repressive Hypothesis,‛ 15-50. 
6 Foucault, ‚The Confession of the Flesh,‛ 196. 
7 Here, again, Foucault’s use of the concept of an apparatus for political/critical ends is largely in-step with 
Baudry, who believes that the concealment of an apparatic structure can have pernicious ideological 
consequences and, thus, that its manifestation can produce a ‚knowledge effect‛ that can work in the service 
of ideological critique.  See Jean-Louis Baudry, ‚Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Appara-
tus,‛ in Philip Rosen (ed.), Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 286-
298.  Still, while formally similar, there are also stark differences between Foucault and Baudry’s respective 
approaches (e.g. their views on psychoanalysis). 
8 Paola Cavalieri thinks Foucault missed many opportunities to deconstruct the notion of ‚animality,‛ and 
she criticizes his ‚blatant blindness‛ when it comes to thinking about other animals.  See Paola Cavalieri, ‚A 
Missed Opportunity: Humanism, Anti-Humanism and the Animal Question,‛ in Jodey Castricano (ed.), 
Animal Subjects: An Ethical Reader in a Posthuman World (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 97-
123.  Donna Haraway also highlights Foucault’s ‚species chauvinism.‛  However, she clearly believes that 
Foucauldian concepts can enrich our thinking about human-animal relations. See Donna Haraway, When 
Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 60.  Following Haraway, I intend to take a 
more constructive approach to Foucault’s work. 
9 Giorgio Agamben, ‚What is an Apparatus?‛ in What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, trans. David Kishik 
and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 1-24. 
10 Ibid., 12.  Here, Agamben writes that an apparatus refers back to ‚okonomia, that is, to a set of practices, 
bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient – in a way 
that purports to be useful – the behaviours, gestures, and thoughts of human beings.‛ 
11 Ibid., 14. 
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logy as one example) and, on the other, we have living beings.  Finally, Agamben goes on to 
say that a third element, ‚subjects,‛ emerge from ‚the relation and, so to speak, from the 
relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses.‛12  It is a live question whether or not 
other animals can also become ‚subjects‛ in this way, but this shift from ‚human‛ to ‚living‛ 
beings helps us to begin to acknowledge that the experiences (and subjectivities) of other 
creatures may also be deeply shaped by the apparatuses within which they are situated.13  
Following Agamben, we can think of apparatuses as complex spaces where a variety of 
different elements – both organic and inorganic, living and nonliving, human and nonhuman 
– interact, support, and conflict with one another in a multitude of different, and mutually 
constitutive, ways.14  One advantage of this recasting is that it allows us to expand imagina-
tively beyond the exclusively human realm of concerns that structured the purview of Fou-
cault’s various studies. 
 ‚Apparatuses of animality‛ may be an appropriate title for the domains I am interested 
in exploring, and these apparatuses certainly contain all of the multifarious and heterogeneous 
elements that Foucault enumerates in his definition above.  It will be useful to highlight some 
of these elements, while keeping in mind that this list is by no means exhaustive, so as to get a 
sense of the terrain that needs to be explored. 
 Discourses pertaining to/focused on other animals are continuously emerging from 
ethology, comparative psychology, sociobiology, veterinary medicine, agricultural enginee-
ring, dog breeding circles, and literature and film.  Institutions, broadly conceived, would 
include practices such as pet-keeping and animal husbandry; more narrowly, we might think 
of religious organizations (e.g. animal sacrifice), universities (e.g. animal research), and 4H 
Clubs (e.g. sheep rearing) as institutional sites where animals are implicated in various ways.  
Architectural forms encompass slaughterhouses, laboratories, zoos, aquariums, animal shel-
ters, and ‚dog Meccas.‛15  Regulatory decisions and laws in Canada include the Canadian 
Agricultural Products Act and the Health of Animals Act.  In the United States, one would 
have to consider the Humane Slaughter Act and the Animal Welfare Act.  Criminal code pro-
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 For a fascinating (Foucauldian) exploration of some of the ways that bovine subjectivity is constituted in 
relation to new robotic milking technologies, see Lewis Holloway’s, ‚Subjecting Cows to Robots: Farming 
Technologies and the Making of Animal Subjects,‛ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 25 (2007), 
1041-1060. 
14 My use of the term ‚apparatus‛ may share some affinities with Bruno Latour’s use of the term ‚network‛ 
(wherein many incommensurable elements interrelate in a mutually constitutive fashion).  Furthermore, 
Latour’s attempt to make the laboratory visible, as an important node in the circulation of a variety of forces, 
is similar to Baudry’s attempt to force the cinematic apparatus into the light, to Foucault’s reconstruction of 
an apparatus of sexuality, and to my own attempt, here, to draw attention to pernicious elements of the 
slaughterhouse.  For some examples of Latour’s approach, see, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 
trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) and Bruno Latour, ‚Give Me a Labora-
tory and I Will Raise the World,‛ in Mario Biagioli (ed.), The Science Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 
1999), 258-275. 
15 LA Dogworks recruited a ‚top architectural team‛ and ‚the best mechanical engineer in the animal care 
industry‛ to design a boarding/grooming facility that offers exclusive spa treatments and ‚retail therapy‛ in 
the boutique.  See http://ladogworks.com/welcome.html for more information. 
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visions related to bestiality (sec.160 in Canada’s), animal cruelty statutes, and municipal 
bylaws affecting restaurant operation and pet ownership are further legal elements of interest.  
Administrative measures could involve decisions to allow/bar pets from workplaces or study 
spaces.16  Scientific statements are made by ethologists, zoologists, evolutionary biologists, etc., 
and philosophical propositions are advanced on the nature of animal minds, with respect to 
the essential differences between humans and other animals, and, of course, with respect to 
their moral status.  Moral propositions are contained in animal ‚rights‛ and ‚liberation‛ 
discourse and in arguments for vegetarianism.  Finally, philanthropic propositions (and solici-
tations) can be heard coming from humane societies, PETA, and Greenpeace.  This group is 
heterogeneous, no doubt, and this heterogeneity invites a number of preliminary questions.17 
 As far as the specification of a particular apparatus of animality is concerned, we might 
begin by asking what types of relations are, or can be, established between these various 
elements.  What types of understandings of other animals are promoted at particular junc-
tions; how are particular animals treated in specific locations; and, how are human actors 
invited/forced to act in various situations?  My intuition is that no coherent, overall picture 
will emerge and that, in trying to hold these different elements together, we will be glaringly 
confronted with aspects of what Gary Francione has called a human ‚moral schizophrenia‛ 
with regards to other animals.18  We need only think of the different spaces occupied by, and 
discourses concerning, companion animals and livestock animals to get a sense of the vast 
incongruities in the ways that particular human and nonhuman animal bodies are constructed 
within different apparatuses.19  My hope is that the incoherence evidenced by a consideration 
of these diverse and incommensurable elements will be instructive.  Investigations and com-
parisons of different apparatuses can, I believe, provide the occasion for disruptive thoughts 
that will allow us to think about our relations with nonhuman animals in new ways. 
 
                                                 
16 The question of whether or not to allow dogs in the student carrel room was addressed at one meeting of 
my departmental student union. 
17 My examples point primarily towards domestic (and captive) animals and this is where my focus will 
remain.  These contexts are the most obvious places to start when it comes to an extension of Foucauldian 
insights/categories, but I also am convinced that Foucault’s thought can contribute to a conceptualization of 
human relations with (and management of) wildlife.  
18 Gary L. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights – Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2000), see especially chapter 1.  Also, see his article, ‚Animals – Property or Persons?,‛ in Cass R. Sun-
stein and Martha C. Nussbaum (eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 108-142. 
19 Foucault highlighted a seemingly similar schizophrenia in the strictly human context – what he called an 
‚antinomy of political reason‛ – namely, the ‚coexistence in political structures of large destructive mecha-
nisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life.‛  See Michel Foucault, ‚The Political Tech-
nology of Individuals,‛ in Power (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol.3), ed. James D. Faubion (New 
York: The New Press, 2000), 405. 
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II. Technologies 
Human interactions with other animals can be explored along two (Foucauldian) axes.  Each 
contributes to the creation of a critical lens that allows us to envision new (and better) forms of 
interrelationship.  The idea that there are better and worse ways to interrelate with other 
creatures implies that there are some normative fulcrums around which a critique can be 
developed.  These pivots will come to light in the discussion that follows. 
 Foucault indicated that two matrices of practical reason kept his attention most in his 
research.  On the one hand, he was interested in what he called ‚technologies of power.‛  
These are technologies that ‚determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain 
ends or domination‛ – they involve ‚an objectivizing of the subject.‛20  Discipline and Punish 
might be taken as the primary example of Foucault’s examination of these particular techno-
logies.21  On the other hand, he was also interested in ‚technologies of the self.‛  These are 
technologies, according to Foucault, that ‚permit individuals to effect by their own means, or 
with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.‛22  He investigated this second 
form of technology primarily in the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality (The Use of 
Pleasure and The Care of the Self).23  Obviously, Foucault uses the term ‚technology‛ in a very 
broad sense.  It does not refer simply to equipment, tools, or material means, but to all the 
techniques, practices, and disciplines that can be pressed into the service of achieving a 
particular goal or objective.  For his part, Foucault was especially interested in cases where the 
goal/objective of the application of particular technologies is the creation of a certain kind of 
human subject. 
 Given my own concerns, I am most interested in cases where these ‚technologies‛ also 
implicate other animals.  First of all, I am interested in looking at instances where animals are 
submitted to ‚certain ends,‛ that is, where they are dominated and/or objectivized in some 
way.  More specifically, I would like to focus on sites where power relations affect/involve 
both humans and other animals at the same time.  Secondly, I think that it is important to look 
at the ways that human beings act on themselves in various ways, or engage in various 
practices, which attempt to establish (or express) a particular type of relation to other living 
creatures and where, in doing so, they also aim to make themselves a certain kind of person 
(e.g. vegetarianism).  I take up the first task in the present paper and leave the second for a 
future inquiry.24 
                                                 
20 Michel Foucault, ‚Technologies of the Self,‛ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984, vol.1), ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1998), 225. 
21 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (2nd ed.) (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
22 Foucault, ‚Technologies of the Self,‛ 225. 
23 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, vol.2 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); The 
Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, vol.3 (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).  Another relevant source 
would be the 1981-82 lectures given at the College de France, published as Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
24 For work that pursues this second line, see Chloë Taylor’s, ‚Foucault and the Ethics of Eating,‛ in Foucault 
Studies 9 (2010).  
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 My investigation of a particular ‚technology of power‛ begins with an outline of Fou-
cault’s different conceptualizations of power.  In this section, I consider whether it makes 
sense to think of other animals as implicated in ‚power relations‛ in the Foucauldian sense.  
Next, I look at one apparatus of animality – the slaughterhouse – where disciplinary power is 
brought to bear on both human beings and other animals.  Here, I focus primarily on an article 
published in The New York Times on June 16th, 2000, titled ‚At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things 
Never Die.‛25  In my analysis of this piece of journalism, I draw periodically on the work of 
Ralph Acampora.  His bioethical thought provides a variety of helpful theoretical tools that 
can be used to critically assess one of the political ‚environments‛ we share with other ani-
mals.  These tools provide my (Foucault inspired) analysis with some grounds for/guides to 
normative critique. 
 
III. Power 
The question of power was most explicit in Foucault’s work from the mid-‘70s to the early 
‘80s.  Three more or less distinct elements in his thinking can be marked, each presenting va-
rious opportunities, and barriers, for understanding how human interactions with other 
animals might be conceived of as power relations.26 
 Disciplinary power was Foucault’s initial focus.  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault deve-
lops a historical thesis which argues that the ‚classical age discovered the body as object and 
target of power‛ and that this targeting focused on the body as something that can be ‚mani-
pulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skilful and increases its forces.‛27  
As the introduction to the book so effectively displays, this disciplinary power stands in 
contrast to a sovereign form of power that was embodied in the right to kill and which was 
often deployed in an excessive, and clumsy, fashion.28  Armies, schools, hospitals, and prisons 
                                                 
25 The article, ‚At a Slaughterhouse, Some Things Never Die,‛ by Charlie LeDuff, is reprinted in Cary Wolfe 
(ed.), Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 183-197. 
26 In this section, I venture across much of the same terrain that was first charted out by Clare Palmer in 
‚‘Taming the Wild Profusion of Things’? A Study of Foucault, Power and Animals,‛ Environmental Ethics 23 
(2002): 339-358.  My approach differs from Palmer’s primarily in terms of organization and emphasis, as I am 
interested in drawing some more general ethical conclusions about the power relations I discuss, which is a 
move Palmer explicitly resists.  Elsewhere, Palmer presents an interesting analysis of Foucault’s only 
extended discussion of ‚animality;‛ see Clare Palmer, ‚Madness and Animality in Michel Foucault’s 
Madness and Civilization,‛ in Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco (eds.), Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity 
(London & New York: Continuum, 2004), 72-84. 
27 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136. 
28 For an excellent application of the theoretical tools of Discipline and Punish to the topic of intensive pig 
farming, see Dawn Coppin’s, ‚Foucauldian Hog Futures: The Birth of Mega-Hog Farms,‛ Sociological Quar-
terly  44 (2003): 597-616.  For a discussion that goes in a different direction than the one I’ll pursue here, see 
Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel’s, ‚Cows and Sovereignty: Biopower and Animal Life,‛ Borderlands E-journal 1:2 
(2002).  Wadiwel starts from the distinction between sovereign and disciplinary power and then moves into 
an exploration of the ways that Agamben’s reflections on sovereignty, bare life, and biopower are relevant 
for thinking about human–animal relations.  Also, Nicole Shukin’s, Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Bio-
political Times (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), works imaginatively (and critically) with 
the Foucauldian concepts of biopower and biopolitics. In comparison, my analysis has a much more modest/ 
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are, for Foucault, prime examples of sites where this new, meticulous form of disciplinary 
power was exercised and developed.  His related notions of ‚docility‛ and the ‚docile body‛ 
are also closely connected with this particular form of power.  A docile body is one, for 
Foucault, that ‚may be subjected, used, transformed and improved‛29 by various exercises and 
regimens.  Docility is inculcated and perpetuated by a variety of techniques, such as the distri-
bution of individuals in space by enclosure, partitioning and ranking (e.g. in barracks, 
classrooms, etc.), by the control of activity (e.g. with time-tables, training to perform particular 
gestures, etc.), and through various forms of surveillance (e.g. panopticism). 
 One of the main obstacles to using the idea of disciplinary power to think about human 
interactions with other animals is the problem of deciding whether or not we can think of 
other creatures as ‚docile bodies.‛  In other words, does it make sense to use concepts like 
‚subjection,‛ ‚transformation,‛ and/or ‚improvement,‛ when we think about the ways that 
the bodies of other animals are acted upon and caused to perform in different contexts?  I 
think that it does.  Teaching a dog to sit seems to be a simple example of the manipulation of a 
particular body.  That is, the possibility of training seems to evidence a degree of docility pos-
sessed by the canine.  And this is just one of the ways in which we transform, ‚improve‛ and 
instill capacities in the bodies of other creatures.  More extreme examples can also be envi-
sioned.  Think of turkeys that can no longer move or support their own bodies because they 
have been bred to be more palatable for Thanksgiving and Christmas consumers. 
 The juxtaposition of these two examples should caution us against reading a strictly 
pejorative tone into Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary power.  To acquire any number of 
skills (say, being able to get dressed or to use the bathroom), our bodies must be rendered 
docile in a variety of ways.  I must be subjected to a variety of routines and exercises – I must 
be disciplined – to acquire the abilities that are necessary to perform these actions.  There is 
not anything necessarily pernicious about discipline, in either the human or the nonhuman 
case – as I think the dog-training example could support.30  But, clearly, disciplinary power can 
take problematic forms in certain contexts.  Foucault obviously thought the prison was one 
such instance and I believe that turkey farming is another.  In the next section, I will argue that 
the slaughterhouse should definitely be seen as a troubling disciplinary institution.  In other 
words, it should be viewed as a site where many docile bodies (both human and nonhuman) 
are subjected, used and transformed in problematic ways.  Discipline is problematic, or so I 
will argue, when the individual is ontologically reduced in a way that elides their indivi-
duality/singularity. 
 A second conceptualization of power, advanced in later work, portrays power as a 
productive force.  Foucault presents this particular account as an alternative to what he calls the 
liberal, or the ‚juridico-discursive,‛ model of power.  Foucault thinks that this conception 
                                                                                                                                                                  
preliminary character, though ultimately I feel that it is very much in sympathy with the ‚zoopolitcal‛ 
critique that Shukin aims to engage in. 
29 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136. 
30 This is not to say that I believe animal training is always morally benign, or that it cannot be corrupted by 
a trainer’s bad faith, but only to suggest that human interactions with other animals must be seen as existing 
along a broad spectrum of possibilities.  For a great discussion of animal training, see Paul Patton, ‚Lan-
guage, Power, and the Training of Horses,‛ in Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal, 83-99. 
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(which sees power as a restrictive force, exercised from top to bottom, and as something that 
can be transferred like a commodity) is inadequate for understanding our modern social 
order.  For him, power is not that which is exercised by a sovereign over its subjects, rather, it 
‚is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.‛31  
Foucault invites us to think of power as something that is channeled through various struggles 
and conflicts.  Dominant forms of power, and those forms that resist it, are not to be seen as 
separate entities, but as interrelated.  Power is not simply a repressive force – it also produces 
the possibility of its own subversion. 
 Foucault advances a number of methodological prescriptions to guide investigations of 
power understood in this way.32  These methodological points can be further extended to help 
us to explore our interactions with other animals.  First, Foucault instructs us to look at how 
power works at its extremities.  For his part, he indicates that he is less interested in looking at 
how general theories of punishment might be grounded in ideas about sovereignty, or 
monarchal/democratic rights, and more interested in looking at how the power of punishment 
is embodied in particular local, regional and material institutions.  Similarly, rather than be-
ginning with a general theory of the rights, or moral standing, that other animals might be 
said to possess, it will be germane to look directly at those places where other animals come 
into contact with human beings, so that we can see how power might be functioning in those 
concrete instances.33 
 Secondly, Foucault insists that we should not look for intentions/motivations behind 
particular expressions of power.  He wants us to ask, not, who has power and how do they use 
it, but rather, where is power installed and what are its real effects?  This point is meant to 
develop Foucault’s insistence that power not be conceived of abstractly, or as a possession that 
exists apart from individuals that they can decide to retain or alienate.  He wants us to see 
power as a force that actually shapes and constitutes individuals in their subjectivity.  Fou-
cault thinks that we should ‚discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, 
really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, ma-
terials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a 
constitution of subjects.‛34   
 Going back to a question that first reared its head in my appeal to Agamben, we must 
ask, can we think of other animals as ‚subjects‛ in this sense, that is, as beings whose very 
existence is shaped and constituted by power in some significant way?  I think that we can.  
Neither human beings, nor other animals, are Hobbesian fungi; that is, neither we, nor they, 
‚suddenly (like mushrooms) come to full maturity.‛35  We, and they, are gradually, progres-
                                                 
31 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, 85. 
32 Michel Foucault, ‚Two Lectures,‛ in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. 
Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).  See especially p. 96-102, for Foucault’s discussion of these 
methodological points. 
33 Palmer endorses a similar point, suggesting that it is best to begin analysis by looking at a variety of 
‚micropractices.‛  See Clare Palmer, ‚‘Taming the Wild Profusion of Things’?,‛ 346. 
34 Foucault, ‚Two Lectures,‛ 97. 
35 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or The Citizen, ed. Sterling P. Lamprecht (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Inc., 1949), 100.  It is clear that Hobbes uses this metaphor as a thought experiment and that he does not 
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sively, really and materially constituted in different contexts by a variety of different forces.  
Animals in the wild will be very different from their laboratory (or zoo) raised counterparts.36  
A dog confined to a cage at a shelter is a very different creature as compared to a well-loved 
family companion.  In this sense, other animals are subjects that are shaped by a variety of 
forces, and who respond to that shaping in many different, and idiosyncratic, ways.  They are 
not inert objects without the ability to react or respond. 
 Thirdly, and developing the previous point, Foucault suggests that power must be 
analyzed as something that circulates and flows, and not as something that is possessed by 
one individual or group.  We should not think of individuals as either powerful or powerless, 
as only power’s ‚inert or consenting target,‛ but as always in the ‚position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power.‛37  This is one of the ways in which Foucault asks us to 
understand power as not only a repressive force, but also as a productive one.  Power does not 
just say ‚no‛ – it can also produce, enable and empower.  I have suggested that we can think 
of other animals as Foucauldian subjects, but perhaps here we are given another occasion to 
pause.  Can we also think of them as individuals who can exercise (or are exercised by) power 
in some meaningful way?  Admittedly, this type of agency is difficult to visualize.  Cows on 
the way to slaughter are sometimes quite reluctant to follow the herd (in which case they are 
prodded on towards their fate) and my cat puts up a real fuss when I try to clip his claws. 
Clearly, animals do resist in various scenarios.  But I suspect that most would see this as a 
simpler form of resistance than the types of redirection and reappropriation of power that 
Foucault seems to have in mind.  One explanation for this limited range of resistance may be 
the fact that many animals find themselves within human systems that are constructed so as to 
ensure a kind of perpetual domination.  As Clare Palmer puts it:  
 
from a Foucauldian perspective perhaps we can think of human/animal relations as, 
broadly, consisting of multiple individual micro-situations in a variety of environments 
where animals may respond unpredictably, resist human power, and even exercise power 
themselves; but these micro-situations are, ‚invested, colonized, utilized, involuted... by 
ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination.‛38 
 
Thus, on the one hand, this methodological prescription may help us to pinpoint sites where 
animals are dominated in problematic ways by having their avenues for resistance and 
response foreclosed.  On the other hand, in considering this particular point, we might also 
think of the various movements and responses – such as are advanced by activists of various 
                                                                                                                                                                  
think that humans actually come into being fully formed in this spontaneous manner.  Foucault’s suggestion 
seems to be that we should avoid these hypothetical/abstract philosophical beginnings; he would rather 
have us deal with the detail/complexities that confront us.  
36 Sarah Whatmore presents a compelling picture of how enmeshment in a particular context causes 
Duchess, an elephant, to become a very different creature as compared to her wild counterparts.  See the 
third chapter of Sarah Whatmore, Hybrid Geographies: Natures, Cultures, Spaces (London: SAGE Publications, 
2002), ‚Embodying the Wild: Tales of Becoming Elephant,‛ 35-58. 
37 Foucault, ‚Two Lectures,‛ 98. 
38 Palmer, ‚‘Taming the Wild Profusion of Things’?,‛ 352.  The quote in Palmer’s text is from Foucault’s 
‚Two Lectures,‛ 99. 
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stripes – which human beings forge on behalf of other creatures.  These individuals respond 
and react within the web of power relations in a variety of strategic ways that other animals 
are largely incapable of (e.g. running for political office, working for legislative reform, dis-
rupting whaling fleets, passing out literature on factory farming methods, etc.). 
 The fourth prescription put forward by Foucault is that one must conduct an 
‚ascending‛ analysis of power.  This analysis must start with power’s ‚infinitesimal mecha-
nisms,‛ each of which has its own history and trajectory, its own techniques and tactics.  He 
does not think we should start with some general fact, such as the dominance of a particular 
class, and then proceed to account for particular phenomena in terms of this fact (a descending 
mode of analysis).  Rather, one ‚needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lo-
west level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function.‛39  It is with this point in 
mind that I would like to use the slaughterhouse as a starting point.  I am interested in deter-
mining how power is able to function and circulate in this particular institution, and I am 
interested in exploring the consequences this circulation has for the various bodies situated 
within its walls. 
 Thus far we have seen two elements in Foucault’s conceptualization of power: a 
historical thesis about the development of disciplinary power and some methodological pre-
scriptions with respect to theorizing power as a productive force.  Finally, one finds a power/ 
freedom connection in Foucault’s last work on the topic. 
 In ‚The Subject and Power,‛ Foucault indicates – as is clear from my survey thus far – 
that it is the subject, and not power in and of itself, that has formed the general theme of his 
research.40  When thinking about power, he is concerned with the way it affects and shapes the 
body and the individual, that is, with the way it subjugates and subjectivizes.  At this point, 
Foucault distinguishes power relationships from relationships of communication and from 
what he calls ‚objective capacities.‛  He characterizes objective capacities as powers that are 
exerted over ‚things‛ and which are able to modify, use, consume, or destroy them.  Con-
versely, the power he wants to analyze brings into play relations between individuals: ‚the 
term ‚power‛ designates relationships between ‚partners.‛‛41  We might wonder how other 
animals would fit into this distinction.  They are certainly subjected to our objective capacities, 
that is, they are modified, used, consumed, and destroyed in a variety of ways, but I would 
balk at characterizing them simply as ‚things.‛  Furthermore, it seems to be a question whet-
her we can think of humans as involved in ‚relations‛ with other animals and whether we can 
think of them as ‚partners‛ (a point that I touched on in the discussion of subject-hood above).  
It seems likely that Foucault would slot them into the ‚thing‛ category – at least he gives us no 
reason to think otherwise – and thus that he would exclude them from his central concerns.  I 
would insist that a more expansive ontology is needed.  The person/thing distinction does no 
justice to a world in which we exist, interact and communicate with, other animals.  While it 
might be the case that other animals are not our ‚partners‛ in every way that other human 
beings can be, it is useful to conceive of them as subjects of power in Foucault’s sense.  His 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 100. 
40 Michel Foucault, ‚The Subject and Power,‛ in Power (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol.3), 326-348. 
41 Ibid., 337. 
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person/thing dichotomy is ultimately inadequate, serving, as it does, to occlude a whole 
domain of social, political, and ethical questions/problems. 
 It is important to note, however, that Foucault does not think that these three domains 
(relations of power, communication and objective capacities) are always distinct; rather, they 
overlap and intersect with one another in various ways: 
 
Take for example, an educational institution: the disposal of its space, the meticulous 
regulations that govern its internal life, the different activities that are organized there, the 
diverse persons who live there or meet one another, each with his own function, his well-
defined character – all these things constitute a block of capacity – communication – 
power.42 
 
It is illuminating to think of the slaughterhouse as another example of a block of capacity – 
communication – power.  But I would stress, in contrast to Foucault’s approach, that it is es-
sential to resist the ontological reduction of other animals to ‚things,‛ and to consider how 
they are integrated into, and affected by their participation in this particular block. 
 The distinction between relationships of violence and relationships of power also raises 
questions about the application of Foucault’s thinking to relationships between humans and 
other animals.  On the one hand, according to Foucault, a ‚relationship of violence acts upon a 
body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities‛; 
on the other hand, a power relationship:  
 
can only be articulated on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is really to be 
a power relationship: that ‚the other‛ (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized 
and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of 
power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up.43 
 
In the case of an institution like the slaughterhouse, it looks as though we have a relationship 
of violence, not power, as far as the animals killed there are concerned.  That is, there does not 
seem to be a field of responses that are available to them, and they are certainly not recognized 
as subjects in any meaningful way.  As we will see, the slaughterhouse provides us with a case 
where a relationship of violence is connected in an intimate way to a multitude of power 
relationships.  Indeed, I will show that the violence inflicted on other animals, and the onto-
logical reduction that undergirds it, is interwoven into the fabric of the human relationships 
found in the abattoir.  Of course, things are different in other apparatuses of animality.  An 
individual training a dog, or a horse, is perhaps more clearly involved in a relationship where 
communication and some form of reciprocity/partnership are possible.  Thus, these might be 
cases where a relationship between a human and another animal can be seen as a proper 
power relationship, in the Foucauldian sense. 
 In ‚The Subject and Power,‛ Foucault defines ‚power‛ as a mode of action upon the 
actions of others and he explicitly connects it with the idea of freedom: ‚Power is exercised 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 338. 
43 Ibid., 340. 
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only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‚free.‛‛44  By characterizing power in this 
way, Foucault connects his analysis with the idea of ‚governmentality,‛ which he presents as 
a form of power that structures the field of possible actions for the individuals under its 
dominion.  He thinks that there is no relationship of power when determining factors are 
exhaustive (this would be a relationship of violence/domination) and, thus, that a relationship 
involving governance is one that allows space for mobility and resistance (a point that 
connects back to Foucault’s productive characterization of power).  The idea of ‚government‛ is 
a useful concept for thinking about the ways that human beings relate to other animals (while 
realizing that we need to be mindful of the fact that ‚domination‛ also characterizes many 
interspecies interactions), since we structure the possible field of actions for many other 
animals in a large number of ways.  And I think that the scare quotes around the word ‚free‛ 
in the quote above leaves the door open to this particular application of Foucault’s thought.  
That is, they seem to indicate that Foucault is skeptical of the idea that human beings possess 
an unconstrained autonomy/freedom.  This skepticism would appear to undermine what has 
often been assumed to be one of the essential differences between ‚man‛ and ‚the animal,‛ 
namely, the human possession of a free will – and an accompanying responsibility – as op-
posed to the animal’s instinct driven, robot-like existence.45  If humans are not radically free, 
that is, if they become what they are in local, specific, and power-laden contexts, then, 
perhaps, our grounds for assuming a sharp difference in kind between human beings and 
other animals is thrown into question. 
 To summarize, I believe that Foucault’s ruminations on the subject of power can be 
developed to help us think about the different ways that human beings relate to other animals.  
His discussion of disciplinary power allows us to begin thinking of other animals as ‚docile 
bodies‛ who are submitted to a variety of techniques, exercises, and regimens in a multitude 
of different contexts.  I have indicated that we should be cautious about seeing all instances of 
discipline as problematic, but reiterate that there are certainly cases where we need to critically 
evaluate discipline’s application and consequences.  Foucault’s methodological considerations 
with respect to productive power point to new regional/local starting points for thinking about 
how other animals are implicated in our lives and for thinking about how that implicatedness 
may call for new ways of thinking about their moral status.  Finally, Foucault’s insistence on 
the power/freedom connection opens new avenues for thinking about how the lives of other 
animals are governed (and dominated) in a myriad of ways.  I pick up on these threads and 
develop them more concretely in what follows. 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 342. 
45 One variation of this position can be glimpsed in Heidegger’s characterization of ‚the animal‛ as ‚poor-in-
world,‛ whereas man is taken to be ‚world-forming.‛  See Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of 
Meta-physics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeil and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), 197. 
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IV. The Slaughterhouse 
In this section, I cast the slaughterhouse as a technology of power through an analysis of a 
journalistic article.46  This may seem odd to some, so I would like to take a moment to explain 
my use of this source. Obviously, LeDuff’s article is a subjective account of one slaughter-
house47 – there are thousands of other stories to be told, all of which would come with their 
own nuances and idiosyncrasies.  Racial tensions loom large in LeDuff’s abattoir, situated as it 
is in the present day, southern United States.  These tensions might be absent in other times 
and places, or to points-of-view blind to their existence.  Different slaughterhouses may be 
managed in different ways, they may have workforces that are more or less harmonious, and 
they may be subject to different demographic realties.  Thus, it might seem ill-advised to try to 
draw out broad generalizations from such a limited sample. But generalization is not my 
primary goal.  Rather, I am more interested in looking at a concrete example to enable a 
‚sensitization.‛ 
 My adoption of this idea of sensitization is inspired by a statement made by Foucault.  
In regard to the Hungarian revolution’s effect on Marxist thought, he claimed: ‚Since 1956 
philosophers have no longer been able to think history by means of preestablished categories.  
They therefore have to resensitize themselves to events. Philosophers must become journa-
lists.‛48  Philosophers must become journalists – that is, be sensitive to events – in order to 
develop more adequate analyses of various developments.  Generally, I take Foucault to be 
calling for openness to being affected, displaced, and/or surprised by what happens around 
us, as opposed to attempting to fit particular events into a pre-established framework that is 
built with stale categories and concepts.  Using journalism as a springboard for philosophical 
reflection is a way to remain open to being unsettled; this sensitization, in turn, can be the 
                                                 
46 There are obviously many other sources that one might also consider.  Upton Sinclair’s novel, The Jungle: 
The Uncensored Original Edition (Tucson: Sharp Press, 2003), is a classic.  The third chapter in Peter Singer’s 
Animal Liberation (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), ‚Down on the Factory Farm<,‛ 95-158, has 
had widespread effect. Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation: the Dark Side of the All-American Meal (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), and Richard Linklater’s film based on the book, would also be 
interesting to look at, as would Gail Eisnitz’s The Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Tale of Greed, Neglect, and 
Inhumane Treatment Inside the U.S. Meat Industry (New York: Prometheus Books, 1997). Paula Young Lee 
(ed.), Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse (Lebanon: University of New Hampshire Press, 2008) 
is an excellent collection of essays that trace the historical development of the slaughterhouse, from the 19 th 
to the early 20th-century, in a variety of European and North American contexts. Lee’s conclusion to the 
volume, ‚Conclusion: Why Look at Slaughterhouses?,‛ 237-243, makes explicit connections between this 
technological form and Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon.  As a final suggestion, Jonathan Burt’s, 
‚Conflicts Around Slaughter in Modernity,‛ in The Animal Studies Group (ed.), Killing Animals (Urbana & 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 120-144, has much to recommend it from a Foucauldian 
perspective, focusing as it does on the wider historical (and technological) context within which it was pos-
sible for mass forms of animal killing to emerge. Burt’s essay also offers an interesting analysis of the ways 
that religious forms of slaughter where supported (or challenged) in debates about ‚humane‛ slaughter. 
47 LeDuff actually became a staff member at the Smithfield Packing Co.’s plant in North Carolina in order to 
conduct research for his piece, thus much of the information comes from firsthand familiarity. 
48 Colin Gordon, ‚Introduction,‛ in Power (Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol.3), ed. James D. Faubion 
(New York: The New Press, 2000), xxxvi.  It is unclear in what context this statement (from 1977, apparently) 
was originally made, since Gordon leaves it unsourced. 
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starting point for new evaluations, insights, and critique.  It is in this spirit that I explore 
LeDuff’s article.  My intention is to start at a local source, to look at how power is applied 
there, and to use this exposure to draw more general insights and conclusions about how 
particular human beings and other animals can be mistreated, misrepresented, and mis-
understood. 
 It is quite easy to see the slaughterhouse in Foucauldian terms, that is, as a site of 
disciplinary power (and domination) where a multitude of bodies are rendered docile.49  These 
bodies are made the objects/targets of power and are thereby subjected, used and transformed.  
One of the requirements of discipline, according to Foucault, is the distribution of individuals 
in a space by means of enclosure and a partitioning into functional sites.50  This distribution is 
certainly evident at the Smithfield Packing Co. pork processing plant (in North Carolina), 
where each individual is assigned a place in more ways than one.  As LeDuff remarks: ‚Every-
thing about the factory cuts people off from one another.‛51  This partitioning takes a number 
of different, mutually reinforcing forms.  First, individuals are cut off from one another by 
spatial organization and task assignment.  Those on the kill floor are separated from those on 
the cut line.  These types of workers are both, in turn, separated from warehouse workers and 
from the managers whose offices are positioned above the factory floor.  This separation is in-
tensified further by the noise in the establishment, that is, by ‚the hammering of compressors, 
the screeching of pulleys, the grinding of the lines,‛52 which makes effective communication 
between employees in the same area impossible.  Furthermore, these spatial and auditory 
separations are buttressed by other barriers, such as language, which separates Spanish and 
English speaking employees, nationality, which separates Americans from Mexicans, and race, 
which creates divisions between white, black and Latino workers.  Finally, I would insist that 
species constitutes yet another axis across which bodies are partitioned.  The pigs also have a 
space to occupy, and a role to play, in the continued functioning of this disciplinary 
mechanism.  For the pigs, however, this particular system might be better conceived of as the 
endpoint of a docile life.  From their perspective, the slaughterhouse can be thought of as the 
point where a docile body – a docility inculcated thanks to confinement and rearing in other 
agricultural contexts (i.e. a hog lot, free-range farm, etc.) – is transformed into a dead body. 
 Hierarchical observation is another instrument of disciplinary power highlighted by 
Foucault.53  This surveillance is one of the means by which coercion and a consequent docility 
are achieved.  At this particular plant, the architectural design helps to create a literal hierar-
chy by placing the managers’ offices on scaffolding above the factory floor.  This arrangement 
allows the workers to be surveyed and assessed.  LeDuff describes one manager as looking 
                                                 
49 My normative evaluations of the slaughterhouse share many affinities with the conclusions reached by 
Mick Smith in ‚The Ethical Space of the Abattoir,‛ Human Ecology Review 9 (2002): 49-58.  While his dis-
cussion draws specifically on the thought of Hegel, Bourdieu, and Levinas, his focus on ‚the evolution of  
deliberate managerial and spatial techniques that seek to suppress the animals’ room for self-expression,‛ 50, 
is quite consonant with the Foucauldian approach I’ll develop here. 
50 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 141. 
51 LeDuff, 187. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 170. 
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like a ‚tower guard‛ or ‚border patrol agent,‛ which invokes the policing role they enact with-
in the factory walls.  If necessary, a manager can descend to the factory floor and discipline a 
worker who has fallen out of line.  The raised location of the managers also helps, presumably, 
to induce a panoptical effect in the workers whereby they begin to discipline themselves; they 
are certainly all too aware that their actions could be under surveillance at any moment. 
 But, there are also hierarchies created amongst the employees on the factory floor.  
There are ‚dirty jobs,‛ such as killing and cutting, and ‚clean menial jobs,‛ involving ware-
house work.  This division of labor appears to intermesh with, and reinforce, hierarchies of a 
racial nature.  Blacks and Mexicans get the ‚dirty‛ jobs; American Indians tend to get the 
‚clean‛ jobs in the warehouse; and the few whites on the payroll ‚tend to be mechanics or 
supervisors.‛54  And, again, we must also acknowledge that the pigs occupy a place in these 
various hierarchies.  It seems to me that it is their absolutely commoditized bodies that create 
the base that keeps this whole pyramid standing. 
 These hierarchical positionings are signaled at a number of points in the article.  For 
example, after being chastised by a white manager, one of the black employees threatens, 
‚Keep treating me like a Mexican and I’ll beat him.‛  The comment clearly indicates that to be 
treated like a Mexican, for this individual, means to be treated as less than he really is.  In 
other words, for him, Mexicans are positioned on a lower rung in the hierarchy.  As another 
example, we might consider a comment made by a convict working at the plant, Billy (quoted 
in my epigraph).  Having been assigned to the cut line, he feels cheated.  He felt, according to 
LeDuff, as though he ‚wasn’t supposed to be doing Mexican work‛; in his own words, he 
declares: ‚This job’s for an ass. They treat you like an animal.‛55  So, again, we see an indivi-
dual feeling as though he is being treated as something less than he really is.  For Billy, this is 
work for a donkey, not a human being.  The fact that he doesn’t want to be treated ‚like an 
animal‛ underscores the fact that other animals occupy a lower place in a hierarchal arrange-
ment.  Furthermore, in his eyes, cutting line work is for a Mexican, not a white American.   
Reading between the lines, we might infer that there is a pernicious parallel being drawn here 
that affects a conflation of the two hierarchical arrangements at play.  By placing the 
animal/human hierarchy next to the Mexican/white American hierarchy, Billy invokes an 
equation of the Mexican with the animal, on the one hand, and the white American with the 
human, on the other.56 
 As problematic as they are, the feelings expressed by Billy are intimately connected to 
the question of dignity.  Human beings want to be treated with respect, that is, they want to be 
treated like humans beings, and not like dogs, cattle or guinea pigs.57  In cases like these, we 
                                                 
54 LeDuff, 184. 
55 Ibid., 187. 
56 Two works that expand on the connection between speciesism and racism, which I allude to here, are Cary 
Wolfe’s Animal Rites (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), especially the fourth 
chapter, ‚Aficionados and Friend Killers: Rearticulating Race and Gender via Species in Hemingway,‛ 122-
168, and Marjorie Spiegel’s The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, revised and expanded ed. 
(New York: Mirror Books, 1996).  
57 Another concrete example of this type of concern occurs in the film Gene Hunters (prod. and dir. Torbjorn 
Morvik and Petter Nome, 54 min., Ying-Yang Films, 1988, videocassette).  There, an indigenous activist 
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see the human/animal distinction being used in a hierarchical fashion.  To be treated ‚like a 
dog,‛ or ‚like a guinea pig‛ – to be treated ‚like an animal‛ – is to be treated as though one 
were not a human being; it is to be treated as though one is less than what one really is.  
People want to be treated like humans, not animals, and I wholeheartedly agree that humans 
should be treated like humans (whatever that might mean).  But these particular formulations 
of that desire leave certain (hierarchical) assumptions about the human/animal binary un-
examined.  Furthermore, pleas for the recognition of one’s dignity that rely on the juxta-
position of the ‚human‛ and the ‚animal‛ leave the fact of human animality unacknowledged, 
fallaciously suggesting that human beings are not animals and ignoring the fact that to be 
treated ‚like a human‛ will involve being treated in a way that is becoming of a particular 
animal.  This implicit hierarchy calls out for a deconstruction. Are nonhuman animals ob-
viously ‚lower‛ than human ones?  Is it problematic that other animals are treated ‚like 
animals?‛ We must acknowledge the possibility that nonhuman animals also have a dignity 
that needs to be recognized.  I am not necessarily suggesting that other animals must be trea-
ted like human beings, but rather, that we make room for considering them on their own 
account, as creatures worthy of a certain form of esteem. 
 Readers of LeDuff’s article can surely admit that a lack of inclusivity contributes to the 
problematic racial relationships in this slaughterhouse; the institution fails to foster, or 
support, the idea of a basic equality existing between human beings regardless of their race.  I 
want to suggest that this slaughterhouse (and perhaps slaughterhouses more generally) occa-
sion a similar failure when it comes to recognizing a common ‚animality‛ running between 
the pigs and their human counter-parts – a commonality that opens up, or so I am suggesting, 
considerations about what dignity and respect will mean in both the human and the 
nonhuman case.  It is clear, in the context of the slaughterhouse at least, that an acknow-
ledgment of this commonality will be next to impossible. 
 Ralph Acampora gives us some theoretical tools that can enrich my Foucauldian inves-
tigation of the slaughterhouse and which help us to make normative evaluations of the power 
relations enacted in this particular space.58 
 Firstly, I am interested in what Acampora calls the dialectic between the carnal and the 
carceral, that is, the relationship between the fleshy, organic excess of the carnal body, on the 
one hand, and the rigid, bounded, and panoptical surveillance of the carceral institution, on 
the other.  For his part, Acampora puts forward a model of animal individuality where the 
individual is conceived of as a ‚body-self,‛ which incorporates its surrounding, and not as an 
‚atomistic subject‛ or ‚mental monad.‛59  This is a model that characterizes the individual and 
environment as being in an inextricably intimate relationship of mutual constitution.  The en-
vironment establishes the horizon in which, upon which, and with which an animal body can 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(living in the rainforests of northern Columbia) speaks out against the collection of her people’s blood by 
scientists working on the Human Genome Biodiversity Project, asserting that the indigenous peoples should 
not be ‚treated like guinea pigs.‛ 
58 Here, I focus primarily on the fifth chapter, ‚Body Bioethics in Realms of the Carnal and the Carceral,‛ in 
Acampora’s book, Corporal Compassion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 95-115. 
59 In this sense, Acampora’s discussion of constitution of individuality is very similar to Foucault’s dis-
cussion of the development of the subject/subjectivity, which I discussed above. 
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act.  That animal body is, in turn, constituted and sustained by the opportunities that this hori-
zon affords.  Acampora suggests that the cage is the prime example of a carceral environment.  
If the individual is constituted by interactions with their environment, then the cage (or, 
carceral environments more generally), will create very particular types of subjects.  In the 
case of a lab rat, Acampora suggests that the ‚rodent comes to phenomenally assimilate the 
carceral into the carnal.‛60  The rat is transformed into what Acampora calls a ‚jailhouse‛ 
body, that is, a body that has incorporated its imprisonment.  He also presents the zoo as 
another example of a context where the ‚carceral petrifies the carnal.‛61  Following Foucault, 
we might say that a particular type of disciplinary environment works to create a particular 
type of (docile) body. 
 In LeDuff’s report, we see a number of ways in which the carcerality of the slaughter-
house is assimilated by the bodies bounded by its walls.  The workers are not encased in this 
building in any kind of abstract way.  Their environment literally penetrates into the materia-
lity of their bodies.  Various examples are presented.  The chlorine used in sanitation proce-
dures burns the eyes and throats of the employees.  After a shift on the cutting line, necks are 
strained and fingers no longer open freely – one woman’s hands ‚swelled like claws.‛  Wor-
kers’ muscles are left sore and their minds are dulled.  Knees lock, noses run and teeth throb.  
At the end of the day, they hurt and they are exhausted.  As far as the pigs are concerned, they 
assimilate this carcerality in a much more dramatic and terminal fashion.  The slaughterhouse 
penetrates their bodies to the point of complete disintegration.  Their lot is to end their pheno-
menal existence with a journey along the ‚disassembly‛ line.  Thus, we see that both human 
and nonhuman bodies are deeply shaped by this (carceral) environment which they inhabit.  
In this light, a common saying from the plant is striking.  It is said that, ‚they don’t kill pigs in 
the plant, they kill people.‛62  The equivocation around the word ‚kill‛ invokes an image of a 
kind of death in life, a zombie-hood grounded in the tasks performed at the plant.  Workers 
simultaneously bring home ‚the bacon‛ and find themselves transformed by their environ-
ment into a slaughterhouse body. 
 A second operation enacted/enabled by this carceral abode is what Acampora refers to 
as the downgrading of particular bodies from ‚the somatic to the corporeal.‛63  His termino-
logy requires some elucidation. In his argument, the term somatic refers to live bodies in all of 
their phenomenal richness and unique singularity.  He would say that humans and pigs both 
have bodily existence in this sense.  The somatic refers to living, autopoietic bodies.  The cor-
poreal, on the other hand, refers to the body as mere brute materiality.  Rocks and chairs 
would be examples of corporeal bodies in this sense.  Acampora argues that laboratories and 
zoos – and I would suggest that the slaughterhouse be seen in a similar light – have emptying 
effects that ‚reduce‛ the bodily beings that are situated there.  In the case of the laboratory, 
rats are reduced to particular gene effects or physiological responses.  One forgets that these 
laboratory rodents remain living creatures.  They come to be identified with their provision of 
                                                 
60 Acampora, 99. 
61 Ibid., 111. 
62 LeDuff, 185. 
63 Acampora, 101. 
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information, disappearing, in effect, as individual animals.  This might also, then, be seen as a 
further way to flesh out what it means to be treated like a guinea pig or ‚like an animal.‛ 
 We see this ‚emptying‛ in other types of contexts.  It is presented very forcefully in the 
dramatic recreation of a Nazi propaganda video called Dasein ohne Leben (Existence without 
Life).64  In the video, a professor lectures to an auditorium full of people, arguing that the dis-
abled and mentally ill are best seen as having an ‚existence without life,‛ which burdens      
the German health care system.  This characterization represents a discursive attempt to enact 
what Acampora calls the downgrading of the somatic to the corporeal.  The speaker says, in 
effect, that these individuals are not living (read: like ‚normal‛/‛healthy‛ human beings).  
Instead, we should see them as merely existing (read: like other animals? like inanimate 
objects?).  Ultimately, in the film, this downgrading is used to encourage the euthanization 
(and, thus, a very literal reduction) of those who have ‚existence without life.‛  Another strong 
example is seen in the critically acclaimed HBO adaptation of Margaret Edson’s play, Wit.65  
There, the protagonist (Vivian, a professor of English Literature) is frequently portrayed as a 
source of data for the doctors.  They are more interested in the information/knowledge she is 
going to provide them and less concerned about the person/life/history that they encounter.  
The great emotional impact of the film is created by the juxtaposition of the instrumen-
talization and coldness of Vivian’s interactions with the doctors next to her own very personal 
reflections on the life she has led and the impact that her cancer is having on her as an 
individual.  Generally, we think that there is something troubling about reducing human 
beings from the somatic to the corporeal; it is perceived as an affront. 
 Analogous reductions take place along numerous lines in the slaughterhouse.  Most 
obviously, porcine individuality is nowhere to be found.  Their reduction – begun in the 
various locations where they have been reared to slaughter weight – continues with the killing 
of the individual pigs when they enter this establishment.  They become ‚shoulders‛ that are 
segmented into different ‚cuts‛ as they travel down the line and are packaged for distribution.  
To echo Linda Birke (whom Acampora quotes), I would say that in the production of meat at 
the slaughterhouse, the living, breathing animals who ate, slept and interacted – often in 
atrocious conditions – literally disappear.  In the slaughterhouse, their individuality is com-
pletely elided as they become inert commodities for human consumption. 
 And it appears that human reductions also take place in this particular slaughterhouse 
– if not from the somatic to the corporeal, then at least from the particular to the (stereo)-
typical.  We find individuals being continually typecast along racial lines: ‚Blacks don’t want 
to work< They’re lazy‛;66 the Mexicans are ‚too small‛ for kill floor jobs; one Mexican worker 
declares, ‚I hate the blacks‛;67 black workers complain that Mexicans are ‚dragging down the 
pay.‛68  In yet another example of reduction, Mexican employees get called ‚Hey you‛ by 
                                                 
64 All of the original copies where apparently destroyed at the end of the second World War, but the por-
trayal I am referring to can be seen in Selling Murder: The Killing Films of the Third Reich (prod. Steward 
Lansley, dir. Joanna Mack, 53 min., Domino Films Ltd., 1991, videocassette). 
65 Wit (prod. Simon Bosanquet, dir. Mike Nichols, 98 min, HBO films, 2001, DVD). 
66 LeDuff, 187. 
67 Ibid., 194. 
68 Ibid. 
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white supervisors who cannot be bothered to learn their names.  The people in this environ-
ment have a hard time seeing each other and this inability leads to distrust, segregation, and 
animosity.  A very tangible effect of these reductions seems to have been the stifling of at-
tempts at collective action with respect to unionization.  In this carceral institution, the dis-
ciplinary partitioning and ranking of individuals along various axes causes individuals to 
effectively disappear. 
 I would like to address two issues here.  First, a moment ago I compared pigs being 
slaughtered to people suffering from cancer and to those who met their demise at the hands of 
Nazi ‚doctors,‛ but I want to stress that my point is not to say that exactly the same kinds of 
reduction are taking place in each case.  However, I do think that there is a similar failure in 
each instance, namely, a failure to appreciate the vulnerability that is an essential facet of both 
human and other animal life. It is this vulnerability, this shared animality – the deterioration 
of the flesh in the face of chemotherapy, the powerlessness of so many vis-à-vis those 
entrusted with their care, the squeals of a pig in pain – that opens up the space for comparison. 
 Secondly, some might be wondering about my appeals to ‚individuality‛ and ‚onto-
logical reduction,‛ worrying that they are in tension with a Foucauldian account of subject 
formation and that they evidence an implicit regression to the language of ‚rights.‛69  This 
worry is explicitly voiced by Lewis Holloway. As he puts it: 
 
representations of animals as morally considerable, or as the bearers of ‚rights,‛ risk 
attributing a particular, fixed subjectivity to animals.  That is, they essentialise what it is to 
be a subject – accepting a centred subjective being rather than a continual process of be-
coming subject, and a heterogeneity of becoming which produces different subjectivities.70 
 
I will make two points in response.  On the one hand, it is not obvious to me that the use of 
rights language is necessarily a regression.  Perhaps we could use this language in a strategic 
fashion without presuming any ‚fixed subjectivity‛ to whom the usage refers.  Foucault him-
self seemed to do exactly this on at least one occasion.71  This is not to say that I think rights 
terminology is the best way to conceptualize the moral status of other animals.  I would just 
point out that this language might be compatible with a ‚continual process‛ view of subject 
formation (which is advanced by the likes of Foucault and Acampora).  On the other hand, I 
think that it is definitely possible to talk about the importance of ‚individuality,‛ or ‚un-
substitutable singularity,‛ in ethical thought in ways that entirely avoid framing the issue in 
terms of rights.  Think, for example, of Jacques Derrida’s encounter with his little cat, that 
‚irreplaceable living being‛ who, as he puts it, ‚one day enters my space, enters this place 
where it *sic+ can encounter me, see me, even see me naked.‛72  This is quite far from a rights 
claim and I believe that it is this individuality (understood as a type of encounterability) that 
the slaughterhouse ultimately destroys.  Furthermore, I believe that one can consistently hold 
                                                 
69 This worry was raised by one of my anonymous reviewers.  
70 Holloway, 1044. 
71 See Michel Foucault, ‚Confronting Governments: Human Rights,‛ in Power (Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984, vol.3), 474-475. 
72 Jacques Derrida, ‚The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),‛ Critical Inquiry 28 (2002): 378-379. 
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that this subjectivity – be it human or nonhuman – is constituted in continual processes of 
becoming (and in relation to a heterogeneity of power-laden apparatic structures) and, at the 
same time, insist that the subjectivities so constituted call for a particular kind of ethical consi-
deration.  Focusing on the effacement of individuality does not belie a Foucauldian approach, 
rather, it helps us identify processes (and structures) in which the creation (or destruction) of 
subjectivity has become intolerable.73 
 Returning to Acampora, we might say that a major consequence of the hierarchical 
reduction taking place in the slaughterhouse is that no ‚conviviality‛ – no ‚authentic en-
counter‛ – is possible.  According to him, the authentic possibility of cross-species conviviality 
diminishes to the extent that ‚the carceral overtakes the carnal.‛74  The adjective ‚convivial‛ 
denotes a fondness for the pleasures of good company, a sense of joviality, and a festive 
energy.  A convivial atmosphere avoids instrumentalization, or reduction, of one at the hands 
of another.  Consider the contemporary zoo as an example of a site that inhibits conviviality.  
Acampora stresses that the ‚zooptical‛ nature of this environment – ‚constituted by capture, 
feeding schedules, architecture of display, and breeding regimens‛75 – disables the possibility 
of authentic encounters between humans and other animals.  Think of a surprise encounter 
with a deer while jogging in the forest in comparison to an encounter with a caged tiger at the 
zoo.  Acampora would juxtapose the tension, heightened awareness, and potency of the gazes 
established between human and animal in the wild, in the former case, with the lethargy, 
boredom, and passivity of the communication between the humans and the incarcerated 
animal, in the latter case. 
 Authentic, convivial encounters with pigs are certainly impossible at the slaughter-
house.  Authentic encounters with other human individuals seem equally stifled.  I am not 
sure what an ‚authentic encounter‛ with a pig would ultimately amount to, but, at a 
minimum, it would have to resist the kind of petrification highlighted by Acampora.  Simi-
larly, the authenticity of human interactions would be improved if there was less reduction of 
individuals along racial, national, and linguistic lines.  But, this may also be impossible in the 
context of the slaughterhouse, given that, as Mick Smith so aptly puts it: ‚Its machinery 
dissects and grinds more than animal bones it also annihilates the space where care and 
compassion might otherwise survive.‛76 
 
                                                 
73 In his discussion of Foucault’s relationship to phenomenology, Todd May suggests that Foucault was 
concerned both with ‚explanatory reductionism‛ (in his early phenomenological work) and with ‚catego-
rical reductionism‛ (in his later archaeological and genealogical projects). See Todd May, ‚Foucault’s 
Relation to Phenomenology,‛ in Gary Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2nd edition (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 284-311.  Obviously more needs to be said, but this at least gives 
me hope that my concern about ‚ontological reduction‛ may not be entirely alien to a Foucauldian inves-
tigation of animals/animality. 
74 Acampora, 100. 
75 Ibid., 113. 
76 Smith, 57. 
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V. Conclusion  
I imagine Foucault would be skeptical of calls for more ‚authentic‛ encounters.  He would 
want us to be vigilantly cognizant of the introduction of new norms and new vectors for 
power’s circulation, and to be doubtful of Edenic visions and utopian aspirations.  And I do 
not mean to suggest, with my appeal to authenticity, that there is one perfect way that we 
might relate with other animals (or with other human beings).  But I do think that we can 
relate to them in better and worse ways, and that we can envision contexts where the faces of 
other animals are met more forthrightly.  I want to evoke something similar to what Donna 
Haraway intends when she talks about ‚truth telling‛ in human-animal relations, that is, ‚not 
some trope-free, fantastic kind of natural authenticity,‛ but a ‚co-constitutive naturalcultural 
dancing, holding in esteem, and regard open to those who look back reciprocally.‛77  Towards 
that end, I believe that a Foucauldian analysis is buttressed by certain normative considera-
tions, for instance, a recognition that ontological reduction is an affront to subjectivity and, 
thus, is something to be highlighted, and combated, when found in particular locations.  An 
analysis directed in this way allows us to critically explore one of the apparatuses within 
which humans and other animals exist and subsist, and it helps us to begin to envision better 
forms of coexistence.  This enhanced Foucauldian lens illuminates the obscured instances of 
power’s expression that color human interactions with nonhuman animals – instances that can 
often appear highly troubling. 
 The idea of an ‚apparatus‛ is a constructive heuristic tool for envisioning the com-
plexity, and the interconnectivity, that characterizes the multifarious places that other animals 
occupy in our thinking and in our lives.  It allows us to conceptualize those spaces where 
living beings (both human and nonhuman) become subjects.  Foucault’s work on the question 
of power helps to illuminate the nooks and crannies of these apparatuses in new and 
interesting ways.  His approach provides methodological guidance for this project – insisting 
that we begin with local, concrete situations.  Acampora’s work provides normative guidance 
– insisting that we guard against ontological effacement.  LeDuff’s article provides a space for 
these various elements to intersect.  Together, they enable a trenchant analysis of a very de-
structive technology of power.78 
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